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What’s breaking into a bank compared with founding a bank?
—Bertolt Brecht, The Threepenny Opera
Defilement is never an isolated event. It cannot occur except in view of a
systematic ordering of ideas. Hence any piecemeal interpretation of pollution
rules of another culture is bound to fail. For the only way in which pollution
ideas make sense is in reference to a total structure of thought whose key-
stone, boundaries, margins and internal lines are held in relation by rituals of
separation.
—Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger
Did Somebody Say Corruption?
George W. Bush and his “coalition of the willing” wage war on the cor-
rupt regime of Saddam Hussein. Islamic fundamentalists deride their
national governments as corrupt and, accordingly, have little love for the
United States, a patron of many of these regimes. The World Bank has
declared that corruption is the single greatest obstacle to global develop-
ment. The Michigan Militia and similar right-wing populist groups claim
that federal institutions, such as the FBI and IRS, are a corruption. Left-
leaning critics and reformers, such as Michael Moore and Ralph Nader,
attack the corruption that presumably plagues American political and eco-
nomic life.
The list could go on and on; it seems that there is hardly any con-
temporary political tendency that does not contain some form of anti-
corruption agenda. It is striking that so many disparate and competing
political discourses all agree that corruption is a problem, oftentimes the
problem. Regardless of the interpretive frame (right, left, populist, tech-
nocratic, religious, secular, etc.), the specter of corruption is a constant,
and is both unavoidable and unquestioned; unquestioned in the sense that
the undesirability of corruption is taken as a given, no substantive argu-
ment is needed—who is, after all, in favor of corruption?—and unavoid-
able in that corruption seems to refer to underlying tensions, antago-
nisms, and traumas that, regardless of one’s conceptual toolbox and
political tendencies, cannot be ignored or passed over.
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These cursory observations highlight the main hurdle in, as well as
the need for, the understanding of corruption. The idea of corruption has
become so universal, so unquestioned, so much a part of various common
senses, that its determinations, historical specificities, and social functions
tend to remain hidden. If this is true anywhere, it is true in regard to the
ever growing popularity of the term corporate corruption. Insider trading
and bribery may likely be placed under the category of “corporate cor-
ruption.” But what about embezzlement or union busting or transfer pric-
ing or planned obsolescence? What makes something a corruption? Fur-
thermore, what’s so bad about corruption?
This essay is an examination of the foundations and function of the
concept of corruption. Discussion focuses on the most developed and
seminal version of the concept in modern society, political corruption.
Beginning with a discussion of definitions of political corruption, the essay
argues that there is a significant and much neglected difference between
modern and premodern understandings of corruption. The modern under-
standing of corruption, it is argued, is directly tied to the rise of the orga-
nization of social life and interests by way of the categories of the public
and private. The main function of the idea of corruption and the rules
and rituals that arise from it has been to keep the categories of the public
and private pure and believable. The homology between the rules regard-
ing clean and unclean foods in Leviticus and the rules regarding clean and
unclean politics in congressional ethics regulations is demonstrated. Based
on this reading of congressional regulations, the key components behind
the modern concept of corruption are identified and exposed. The essay
concludes with a discussion of the implications of this argument for the
question of corporate corruption, the apparent proliferation of anticorrup-
tion discourses, and politics overall.
What Is Corruption?
Nearly all definitions of political corruption emphasize the subversion of
the public good by private interest. Among the more famous definitions of
corruption is the one offered by Joseph Nye (1989): “Behavior which
deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regard-
ing (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or state gains; or vio-
lates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influ-
ence” (966). Similarly, Carl Friedrich (1989) argues that
corruption is a kind of behavior which deviates from the norm actually
prevalent or believed to prevail in a given context, such as the political. It is
10 Peter Bratsis
deviant behavior associated with a particular motivation, namely that of pri-
vate gain at public expense. But whether this was the motivation or not, it is
the fact that private gain was secured at public expense that matters. Such
private gain may be a monetary one, and in the minds of the general public
it usually is, but it may take other forms. (15)1
Contained within the modern understanding of corruption are two inter-
related assumptions: that mutually exclusive public and private interests
exist and that public servants must necessarily abstract themselves from
the realm of the private in order to properly function.
The significance and relative historical novelty of this definition has
been ignored in the contemporary literature on political corruption. The
tendency has been to emphasize the continuity of the concept of political
corruption from the ancient to modern times. Carl Friedrich (1989) has
argued that the basic understanding of corruption as “a general disease of
the body politic” is common to the ancients and the moderns (18). John
Noonan (1984), who defines bribery, presumably the most obvious form
of political corruption, as “an inducement improperly influencing the per-
formance of a public function” (xi), traces the concept back to roughly
3000 B.C. and claims that, although the concept has transformed over time,
it has, in its main contours, remained constant.
Along the same lines, there are usually numerous references to Aris-
totle and Machiavelli in works tracing the history of the concept of cor-
ruption. Aristotle is often cited for his assertion that political forms can be
corrupted. In his classification of the three kinds of constitution, Aristotle
lists kingship, aristocracy, and polity.2 He goes on to note that each can be
corrupted. His discussion of kingship is particularly relevant because what
causes the corruption of kingship into tyranny is the disregard the tyrant
has for his subjects; he rules only to further his own “interests” (Aristotle
1958, 373–75). Machiavelli’s discussion of the function and causes of
corruption are also often discussed, especially as he developed them in
The Discourses in discussing the decline of the republic of Rome (Machi-
avelli 1970, esp. book 1). Sara Shumer (1979) has noted that Machi-
avelli’s discussion of corruption includes the idea of the subversion of the
public by the private: “One dimension of political corruption is the priva-
tization both of the average citizen and those in office. In the corrupt
state, men locate their values wholly within the private sphere and they use
the public sphere to promote private interests” (9).
There are reasons to doubt this official history of corruption as a con-
cept common to nearly all political forms and historical epochs. For one
thing, the apparent lack of a word for bribery in Ancient Greek presents a
problem for those who assume an unbroken line in the concept of cor-
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ruption. Mark Philp (1997) notes that there are many words in Ancient
Greek that make no distinction between a gift and a bribe (doron, lemma,
chresmasi peithein) since, for the Greeks, to persuade through gift giving
was acceptable and no perversion of judgment could be assumed (26).
Philp makes the point that if the Greeks have no conception of bribery,
then the whole idea of a public body in Ancient Greece is put into ques-
tion: “If these were the only terms for bribery in the Ancient Greek world
we would have to take the view that there is a basic untranslatability of the
terms between us and them—that they not only failed to distinguish gifts
and bribes, but that they also had no real concept of public office or
trust” (26). On this point, Philp is absolutely right. He goes on to argue,
following Harvey (1985), that there was a term for bribery in Ancient
Greece, diaphtheirein. However, contrary to Philp’s interpretation, it is
not true that diaphtheirein has the same status as the modern term bribery
or that it can be said to connote a form of corruption in the modern
sense. Diaphtheirein refers to the corruption of the mind by which the abil-
ity to make sound judgments and pursue the good has been impaired
and, more generally, to destruction and decay. Not all bribery is corrup-
tion in the modern sense. A closer reading of Harvey’s discussion of
diaphtheirein reveals this point. Harvey takes great pains to show that in
contrast to and concurrent with neutral and positive terms, there did
indeed exist at least one negative term (diaphtheirein) for influencing
through giving money and gifts. Nowhere, however, do we find any refer-
ence to public trust, private interest, or any category we usually use in dis-
cussing bribery and corruption. Bribery as diaphthora (the more com-
mon version of the word) was negative because it implied that the citizen,
by way of accepting a bribe, was no longer able to properly act as a citizen
since the will and power to judge had been destroyed.3 As Harvey puts it,
“The man who takes a bribe surrenders his free will; what he says and
does he does for another, and in that sense he no longer exists as an inde-
pendent individual: he is a non-entity. That, I suggest, is the essential
point” (86). Instead of some public trust succumbing to private interests,
the recipient of a bribe has lost the ability to be a citizen by relinquishing
his autonomy. Like slaves, merchants, and women, all precluded from
being citizens since they lack basic requisites for properly acting as a citi-
zen, the recipient of a bribe is incapable of the autonomous thought and
moral judgment necessary for being a citizen.4
The categories of the public and the private are integral to the mod-
ern notion of corruption. Put simply, no corruption in the modern sense
is possible if there is no public and private. As Philp’s arguments illustrate,
much of the literature on corruption assumes that the apparent omnipres-
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ence of a concept of corruption is a sure sign that the public and private
are also omnipresent social categories. That the ancient understanding of
corruption is so far removed from the modern one puts this assumption
into question.
Ernst Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies (1957) provides a useful
corrective to this ahistorical tendency in the corruption literature. For
Kantorowicz, our modern understanding of public and private is tied to
the rise in early modern England of the legal and political doctrine of the
king’s two bodies. This doctrine asserts that we have two bodies, a public
and a private one. In its most developed form, the two bodies doctrine
asserts that while, on the one hand, we exist as concrete individuals with
physical bodies, particular passions, interests, obligations, and so forth, on
the other hand, we exist in an abstract sense, as members of the body
politic, a body that is beyond our physical bodies and concrete social exis-
tence. This body politic is the polity, characterized by the common inter-
ests that bind its members together and is materialized in the rituals, per-
sonnel, and institutions of the state (193–272).
It should be noted that this version of public and private differs
greatly from other typical uses of these categories within political thought,
notably, the Arendtian understanding of public and private, most clearly
exemplified by Habermas’s treatise on the public sphere. Habermas (1991)
notes that the terms private and public first appear in German in the mid-
dle of the sixteenth century and argues that no such divisions existed in
feudal societies. He goes on to argue that these categories did exist in
ancient societies and equates the ancient Greek terms of polis and oikos
with public and private (Habermas 1991, chap. 1). Thus, in the Arendtian
sense, the categories of the public and the private are mainly functional
distinctions based on different uses of space. The public sphere becomes
the space within which individuals can come together and discuss and
formulate political opinions and positions. This is contrasted to the state,
on the one hand, with its police and legal functions, and to the private side
of civil society on the other hand, with its family ties and market relations
(Habermas 1991, 30). Although the two distinctions are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, this functionalist distinction between what is public
and what is private is not the distinction between public and private con-
noted by corruption. In political corruption, private interests and pas-
sions come to displace the common good. It is not that public spaces
come to be used for nonpolitical goals, for example, that makes for polit-
ical corruption. Thus, although we see the categories of public and private
applied to most societies, including those of the ancient world, it is usually
done so in this more functionalist way and the categories themselves have
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little in common with the ways in which the ancients understood and
organized political life.5
In light of these observations, the categories of public and private
that our modern concept of corruption presupposes are fairly recent.
Even up to Machiavelli, despite Shumer’s point, noted above, our modern
concept of corruption seems to be missing. Related to the argument
regarding the rise of the public and the private is the question of the rise
of the concept of interests. As Albert Hirschman (1977) has argued, it is
only in the modern era that the concept of interests emerges and this
marks a radical break with premodern conceptions of the good. For
Hirschman it is the increasing dominance of finance and money that
explains the change in the term interest from simply a financial term to a
concept that is central to our understanding and organization of contem-
porary politics.6 It is in this context that Hirschman sheds light on the
question of Machiavelli’s notion of corruption and notes how the term cor-
ruption went through a similar transformation in meaning: “ ‘Corruption’
has a similar semantic trajectory. In the writings of Machiavelli, who took
the term from Poybius, corruzione stood for deterioration in the quality of
government, no matter for what reason it may occur. The term was still
used with this inclusive meaning in eighteenth-century England, although
it became also identified with bribery at that time. Eventually the mone-
tary meaning drove the non-monetary one out almost completely” (40).7
The Greek term diaphthora and the Latin term corruzione, in spite of
their usual translation as “corruption,” refer to an understanding of cor-
ruption that is quite foreign to our modern one. Political corruption is an
exclusively modern phenomenon made possible only after the rise of the
public/private split and the concept of interests. While it may be impossi-
ble, and not particularly important from the perspective of the present
work, to provide some specific date or event that signals the moment that
our modern concept of corruption emerges, it is appropriate to locate it
within the general processes of modernity and claim that our understand-
ing of corruption becomes possible and thinkable as capitalism and the
state emerge and become dominant.8
Why Corruption?
To note the novelty of the modern concept of political corruption and the
basic preconditions of its existence begs the question of why the term
corruption came to represent the idea of the subversion of the public
interest by private interests. This becomes more strongly apparent when
one notes deeper differences in meaning between the two concepts of
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corruption. In the traditional understanding of corruption, there was a
strong imagery of decay and regression, of something becoming less and
less capable, potent, or virtuous. This understanding contained the idea
that through disease, old age, the influence of vice, or any other reason,
the ability to seek the good and virtuous is decreased and possibly destroyed.
Here, we have the corruption of the mind, morals, and the will. The term
still retains this meaning today. We understand the use of the term in the
claim, for example, that the youth of Athens were corrupted by Socrates
and we use the term in essentially the same way when we claim that the
minds of the young are corrupted by the entertainment industry or that
the ability to make sound decisions is corrupted by religious cults, various
psychological disorders, and so on. What is interesting here is that there is
a clear division of good and bad; vice is never good nor is disease or psy-
chosis.
By contrast, in the modern understanding of corruption there is no
division based on something that in itself is good and desirable and some-
thing that is not. Private interests are not bad. Quite the opposite, the
whole line of questioning from Weber’s The Protestant Work Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism to Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests has been
focused on explaining how private interests, particularly in the econo-
mistic sense, came to be welcomed as something positive. How, then, can
two things, public and private interests that are in themselves seen as
proper and good, come to constitute something that is bad and improper?
Mary Douglas (1966) does much to answer this question when she notes
that notions of purity and cleanliness have nothing to do with something
that in itself is dirty. For Douglas, dirt is best understood as something that
is out of place:
Shoes are not dirty in themselves, but it is dirty to place them on the dining-
table; food is not dirty in itself, but it is dirty to leave cooking utensils in the
bedroom, or food bespattered on clothing; similarly, bathroom equipment in
the drawing room; clothes lying on chairs; out-door things in-doors; upstairs
things downstairs; under-clothing appearing where over-clothing should be,
and so on. In short, our pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns
any object or idea likely to confuse cherished classifications. (36–37)
Private interests and public interests are both perfectly fine, as long as they
stay in their proper places. Once we have the contamination of the public
by the private, politicians and politics itself become dirty, tainted, infected,
and thus corrupt. The opposite is equally true. Once we have an invasion
of the private by the public (for example, public authorities being able to
regulate “private” behaviors such as sexual and religious conduct, and so
forth) we come to equally negative conclusions regarding the transgres-
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sion of the categorical separation of private and public. The modern
notion of political corruption is thus much closer to the idea of corruption
as adulteration than the idea of corruption as deterioration and destruc-
tion. This conception of political corruption is consistent with the use of
corruption to describe the loss of the purity of one substance by the intro-
duction of another, in the way that wine can be corrupted by water or a
flower bed can be corrupted by weeds.
To emphasize these differences in meaning, let us take as an illustra-
tion the likelihood that Ronald Reagan had Alzheimer’s disease in the
later years of his presidency. Assuming that the disease had progressed to
the point of hindering his ability to make sound decisions, his condition
would constitute corruption in the classical sense in the same way that
bribery constitutes corruption; his capacity to think and act in an auton-
omous and rational way was diminished. It is obviously not corruption in
the modern sense since there is no instance of the contamination of the
public interest by private interests. The Clinton coffee scandals, in which
prospective campaign contributors were invited to coffees at the White
House, are an example of the latter. It is hard to imagine that drinking
coffee could ever result in corruption in the traditional sense (unless one
became so addicted to it that the ability to reason was lost, one had to
resort to crime in order to support the consumption of coffee, and so
forth) but drinking coffee can easily result in corruption in the modern
sense. If the coffee is being consumed by prospective campaign contribu-
tors in a public area, say, the nonresidential areas of the White House, it
can be said to constitute political corruption because the president is
allowing his private interests to contaminate the purity of the public space.
This space within the White House is not public simply because it is owned
by the public but rather because it is designated for the president’s use as
a public servant, not as a private citizen. If coffee is being consumed and
contributions are being sought in space that is designated for the presi-
dent’s use as a private individual, no corruption is present. The same
people, the same coffee, the same money changing hands; the only differ-
ence is in the room where it is occurring, which constitutes all the differ-
ence between corruption and noncorruption.9
In light of these stark differences, how is it possible that the modern
and traditional ideas of corruption are so easily conflated and confused?
Although the meanings are different, both understandings of political cor-
ruption attempt to establish a normative distinction between what is desir-
able and what is not. In the traditional understanding of political corrup-
tion, the characteristics of a citizen, king, or regime as they should be are
established and contrasted with those characteristics that are seen as bad
or undesirable from the point of view of that ideal reality. In the modern
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understanding, a strict division of the public and private is asserted and
various phenomena that may conflict with that presumed division are
termed a corruption. This difference between what should be and keeping
things in their proper place is immensely significant. On the one hand we
have a normative political project that posits what the good is and on this
basis is able to establish what is corrupt or bad. On the other hand we
have the desirable/undesirable distinction established in a more techno-
cratic and underhanded way. The proper ordering of all things social is
posited in the form of ontological assumptions regarding the public/private
and phenomena that pose a challenge to this vision of how things are
become branded as corrupt.
Since the modern concept of corruption does not function as an
explicitly normative construct but rather as an articulation of categories of
bourgeois political ontology, it has the effect of constituting and reaffirm-
ing the dominant public/private split through its application and subse-
quent categorization of phenomena as corrupt or uncorrupt, as patho-
logical or normal. In so doing, the normative dimension of the modern
concept of corruption becomes manifest precisely because of its way of
categorizing social phenomena. By establishing the division between the
normal and pathological in the public/private split, the modern under-
standing of political corruption is at once making a statement of fact and
presenting us with the political goal of fully realizing the normal. As Georges
Canguilhem (1991) notes in his discussion of the foundations of the con-
cept of the normal:
In the discussion of these meanings [of normal] it has been pointed out how
ambiguous this term is since it designates at once a fact and “a value attrib-
uted to this fact by the person speaking, by virtue of an evaluative judgement
for which he takes responsibility.” One should also stress how this ambiguity
is deepened by the realist philosophical tradition which holds that, as every
generality is the sign of an essence, and every perfection the realization of
the essence, a generality observable in fact takes the value of realized perfec-
tion, and a common characteristic, the value of an ideal type. (125)
In this way, the modern concept of corruption repeats the normative-
political emphasis of the traditional understanding of political corruption
but does so in an essentialist and apolitical manner. The confusion of the
two concepts of political corruption thus appears to be, at least partly, a
result of the similar normative function of situating what is politically
desirable and what is not. But already built into the modern concept of
corruption is an ahistorical and acritical understanding of political phe-
nomena that takes the integrity of the public/private split at face value, as
a quality immanent in all societies, as the normal. For this reason, it is rare
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that the historical specificity and socially embedded quality of the concept
of political corruption becomes visible to observers. Similarly, by conflat-
ing the two concepts of corruption, the reception of the modern concept
of corruption reifies it back throughout history and gives the public/
private split the appearance of the eternal.
Characteristically, most contemporary discussions of political cor-
ruption within political science occur within the subfield of comparative
politics, not normative political theory. Under the guise of discussions on
clientalism, patronage, totalitarianism, civil society, and so forth, com-
parative politics has spent much of its time demonstrating the normalcy of
the United States and other advanced capitalist societies by demonstrating
the pathologies of “less developed” nations.10 In line with the comments
by Canguilhem quoted above, an omnipresent assumption in this litera-
ture is that the public and private are essential attributes of human soci-
eties, that political development and advancement entail the realization of
this fact and the formation of institutions, laws, and attitudes that end the
systematic corruption prevalent in these underdeveloped societies. The
following statement from Jacob von Klaveren (1989) is typical: “We know
that the political systems of the so-called underdeveloped regions still
remain in the stage of systematic corruption, and there are good reasons
for this which we cannot go into here. For simplicity’s sake, let us say that
the Age of Enlightenment has not yet, in a relative sense, occurred there,
which is not too surprising considering the low educational level” (557).11
In a different context, even a political commentator as astute as Hannah
Arendt argues that totalitarianism is characterized by the effacement of
the public-private distinction (Arendt 1968). Totalitarianism, then, is a
corruption of the separation of the public and private, a pathological
negation of the separation of the public from the private, and it is certainly
less desirable than the normal articulation of the public-private split in lib-
eral societies. In this respect, Arendt is no more capable of going beyond
the essentialist bourgeois conception of the public and private than are
mainstream social scientists and their theories of modernization and
development.
Rules of Separation: From Leviticus to Washington, D.C.
The categorizations of academics, however, are not the cause of the divi-
sion between what is considered a normal and a pathological ordering of
the public and private. The academic categories are no more than reflec-
tions of the categories and normative precepts prevalent in bourgeois soci-
eties themselves. What we must understand is how bourgeois societies
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come to form and regulate their conception of normalcy regarding the
public/private split.
As Canguilhem first argued in The Normal and the Pathological
(1991), and as Michel Foucault demonstrated in his various histories of
the practices of normalization (especially Madness and Civilization, 1965),
the question is not simply how the normal is constituted but how the nor-
mal is constituted by way of the production of the pathological. The nor-
mal in the case of corruption, just as in the case of physiological diseases
and mental disorders, is largely a negative category; normal is that which
is not pathological. How do we know what is pathological? There are
rules that inform us. The term normal derives from the Latin term norma
(rule). The normal is that which conforms to the rule. Conforming to the
rule when it comes to political corruption thus refers to not transgressing
the rules that regulate the purity of the public and private. If breaking
these rules is constitutive of the pathological, of corruption, then following
the rules can be nothing but the normal, good, and desirable. If we are to
understand how the normal is constituted, we must be able to identify
those rules that define the pathological and upon whose presence the pre-
sumed purity of the public depends.
Mary Douglas’s analysis of rules of separation is a useful point of
departure for such an analysis. As noted above, Douglas argues that soci-
eties tend to declare “any object or idea likely to confuse cherished clas-
sifications” as impure/dirty/corrupt. These classifications, in turn, are
dependent upon a conceptual edifice “whose key-stone, boundaries, mar-
gins and internal lines are held in relation by rituals of separation.” Most
interesting in terms of its implications toward the analytical task at hand is
how Douglas applies these principles in her explanation of the various
rules regarding clean and unclean food in Leviticus. Douglas attempts to
solve what has long been considered a puzzle by biblical scholars, how to
explain why some animals are considered unclean and others clean: “Why
should the camel, the hare, and the rock badger be unclean? Why should
some locusts, but not all, be unclean? Why should the frog be clean and
the mouse and the hippopotamus unclean? What have chameleons, moles
and crocodiles got in common that they should be listed together?” (42).12
As Douglas notes, there have tended to be two ways of addressing this
problem. One approach has been to view these rules as arbitrary, irra-
tional, and unexplainable, and the other has been to see them as largely
serving educational and disciplinary functions, such as teaching self-
discipline by selecting the most tasty and tempting of creatures as unclean
or selecting those animals that were most likely to harm health and carry
disease, or protecting Jewish culture from the encroachment of neighbor-
ing cultures (30–33, 44–50). Having identified the contradictions and
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inconsistencies in these attempts to explain the rules, Douglas attempts a
new explanation by treating these various rules as exactly what they pur-
port to be, rules of separation. Douglas notes that the traditional idea of
the holy was quite literal; it referred to wholeness, completeness, purity of
form (51–53). Thus, for example, animals appropriate for sacrifice had to
be complete and pure, free from physical imperfections and blemishes.
Similarly, for wholeness and completeness to be realized, the organization
of the world has to be kept pure. In accordance with this meaning of
holy, we find injunctions against sowing the same field with more than one
kind of seed, against plant and animal hybrids, against making cloth by
combining two or more kinds of fibers, against bestiality, and so forth. To
be heterodox and confusing is unholy; things should be kept in their
proper order and not mixed.13
The categorizing of clean and unclean foods, then, has nothing to do
with how appetizing, ugly, healthy, or sloppy the animals are, but, rather,
how pure they are in terms of conforming to their classification. The ani-
mals that are true to life in the sky are birds; they have feathers and two
feet and they fly. All birds that do not fly are unclean since they defy
these principles, as do all things that fly but are not birds. The animals
true to life in the water are fish with scales and fins; all creatures in the
water that do not have these characteristics are unclean. Animals that
roam the earth are four-footed and move by walking, jumping, or hop-
ping. Animals that seem to have two feet and two hands, like crocodiles,
mice, and weasels, are unclean. All creatures that swarm are unclean since
that mode of propulsion is proper to neither sky, nor land, nor water.
Thus, worms, snakes, and the like are unclean. Some kinds of locusts are
clean because they hop; locusts that fly have an attribute that only birds
can properly have. Proper mammals have cloven feet and chew the cud.
Camels, pigs, badgers, and hares all lack one or both of these qualifica-
tions, and therefore are unclean. Members of the antelope family, sheep
and goats, cows, and so on, do conform to these rules, and so they are
clean (Douglas 1966, 56–58).
In this example Douglas provides us with an important illustration of
the idea of cleanliness as keeping things in their proper place. Moreover,
she gives us a model for interpreting other sets of rules of separation.
The task of interpreting rules of separation in relation to political corrup-
tion seems somewhat different than interpreting Leviticus because we
have already identified the basic idea behind the rules against political
corruption, to keep private interests from contaminating the public good.
So, while Douglas’s interpretation of Leviticus is compelling in its ele-
gance and ability to explain all the seemingly anomalous classifications of
clean and unclean, it would apparently not be useful for examining rules
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regarding political corruption. But this would be a false conclusion because
we know only the general principle behind keeping the public/private divi-
sions separate and clean. Why, for example, is it OK for a congressperson
to go on a seven-day trip paid for by a lobbyist but not an eight-day trip?
Why is clientalism corruption, but passing laws that benefit campaign
supporters and contributors usually not? Why are staff members allowed
to lobby the congressional representatives they have worked for after one
year, as opposed to four or five years, or never, or right away? The reality
is that, with one partial exception, there has never in the history of the mod-
ern state been a law against political corruption as such.14 There are only
laws against particular examples of what could be classified as political
corruption: bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, and so forth. So, although
there is no need to deduce the general principle regarding political cor-
ruption, there is a need to examine the rules designed to maintain the
purity and separation of the public and private if we are to be able to
deduce the ideas behind what bourgeois societies understand to be cor-
ruption and what they do not.
A partial list of ethics rules from the House of Representatives fol-
lows, as background for the subsequent discussion in this essay. The rules
are divided according to the kind of activity they refer to, and the wording
of each rule is exactly as it appears in a summary memo of ethics rules
given to all members, officials, and employees of the House of Represen-
tatives (Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 2001).
The House Gift Rule prohibits acceptance of any gift unless permitted by
one of the exceptions stated in the rule. Gifts allowed by the exceptions
include:
—Any gift (other than cash or cash equivalent) valued at less than $50;
however, the cumulative value of gifts that can be accepted from any one
source in a calendar year is less than $100;
—Gifts from relatives, and gifts from other Members or employees;
—Gifts based on personal friendship (but a gift over $250 in value may not
be accepted unless a written determination is obtained from Standards Com-
mittee);
—Personal hospitality in a private home (except from a registered lobbyist);
—Anything paid for by federal, state, or local government.
Members and staff may never solicit a gift, or accept a gift, that is linked to
any action that have taken or are being asked to take.
Private payment of necessary food, transportation and lodging expenses may
be accepted from a qualified private sponsor for travel to a meeting, speak-
ing engagement, or fact-finding event in connection with official duties.
Limit on number of days at the expense of the trip sponsor:
—4 days, including travel time, for domestic travel.
—7 days, excluding travel time, for foreign travel.
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No use of congressional office resources (including equipment, supplies or
files) for campaign purposes.
No solicitation of political contributions from or in any congressional office.
Don’t accept any contribution that is linked to any official action, past or
prospective.
No personal use or borrowing of campaign funds, and no use for official
House purposes.
Avoid mixing of House and private resources.
Official position and confidential information may not be used for personal
gain.
A Member must abstain from voting on a question only if the Member has a
direct personal or pecuniary interest in the question.
Outside Earned Income Limit for Calendar Year 2001—$21,765.
For ONE YEAR after leaving office:
—A Member may not communicate with or appear before a Member, offi-
cer or employee of either House of Congress, or any Legislative Branch
office, with intent to influence official action on behalf of anyone else.
—Very Senior Staff may not communicate with or appear before the indi-
vidual’s former employer or office with intent to influence official action on
behalf of anyone else.
All the important components of the concept of corruption that I
have identified and discussed are present in these rules. The two bodies
principle is evident in the rules that distinguish between the person as a
public servant and as a private citizen. Gifts from family, gifts from other
members of Congress, gifts from close friends, and anything paid for by
public funds are allowed (since in all these exchanges it is either a private-
to-private or public-to-public relationship). Hospitality in a private home
is allowed as long as that person is not a registered lobbyist (thus negating
the distinction of a private home). Members must abstain from voting on
and lobbying for issues in which they have private interests. Similarly,
omnipresent in these rules is the general prohibition against mixing the
public and private. All of the rules are manifestations of this principle; the
suggestion that all House personnel “avoid mixing of House and private
resources” seems clear enough. In this way, the main contours of these rules
clearly conform to the dual conceptual principles of two bodies and cor-
ruption as a mixing of categories.
An interesting gray area is the position of the political candidate.
Reelection campaigns of incumbent members of the House are clearly not
on the public side of the equation; Congressional staff and resources are
not to be used for campaign purposes. No campaign activity, including
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soliciting contributions, is to take place in any congressional rooms or
offices. Even informational mailings to constituents are not allowed within
ninety days prior to a primary or general election since it would be impos-
sible to distinguish between the member sending the mailing as a public
servant or sending it as a candidate. Conversely, campaign contributions
may not be used for public or private purposes. It would seem that candi-
dates for office and campaign contributions are neither public nor private;
they represent an interesting in-between situation, and a position that is
inherently heterodox and “unclean” (perhaps equivalent to larvae that, as
swarming creatures, are unclean but, once they transform into walking or
hopping insects, become perfectly clean). It may be normal to be a private
citizen, it may be normal to be a public servant, but to be a candidate is to
be neither and, thus, the conceptual position of the candidate must be
kept as separate as possible from the usual registers of public and private
to avoid creating confusion.
This interesting in-between case aside, the greatest challenge to inter-
preting these rules of separation is explaining, first, all the possible forms
of corruption against which there are no rules and, second, all those rules
that appear to be arbitrary or, at least, could easily be different and still
conform to the general principles. For example, why should the limit for
allowable gifts be set at $50 and not higher or lower? If the limit were $60,
or $100, or $10, would it not still fulfill the same function and would not
the principles behind the rule remain the same? Similarly, how can we
interpret some of the more general and looser rules, such as the prohibi-
tion against using one’s official position for personal gain?
If anything can be gleaned from Douglas’s analysis of Leviticus it is
that rules of separation are synonymous with the system of ideas; one
constitutes the other. The system of ideas that underlie the rules is itself a
product of the rules. There can be no classification of clean and unclean
without the rules of separation and no rules without classifications. In
this sense, the reason the gift limit is $50 is that there must be a limit, a
rule of separation. This is not to say that the dollar amount is random or
that it could be any amount and still retain its practical function. The first
step in understanding this rule is understanding why there is a need to
place a dollar amount as a limit in the first place. Because there is the $50
rule, not simply some general principle of public/private separation, we
can now identify what conforms to the rule and what does not, we can
now identify the normal and pathological in relation to accepting gifts. In
the same way, the general decrees that public office cannot be used for
private gain or that gifts and contributions can never be linked to actions
that have been taken or that will be taken are utterly meaningless and
have no significance. Why else would someone who is neither a relative
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nor a friend give a gift to a member of the House or provide a campaign
contribution if not as some form of support for an action that was taken
or that he or she hopes will be taken? It is precisely because everyone
knows this to be true that limits are established and the rules of separation
are made specific.15
Examples of this principle appear throughout the rules. We know that
everyone is potentially a lobbyist, so, in order to establish a clear distinc-
tion, the categorization lobbyist is made a technical term referring to those
who are legally registered as such. We know that any number of actions
while in office could result in private gain (indeed, untold numbers of cor-
porations and law firms are willing to pay significant amounts of money to
employ individuals once they leave office, purely on the basis of their
having been in office), so we have a multitude of specific rules that tell us
what constitutes private gain and what does not. We cannot know what
political corruption is without recourse to these rules of separation.
That the limit to gifts should be $50, that privately sponsored travel
has four- and seven-day limits, that additional earned income is limited to
$21,765, all have another foundation as well. As has been noted, the dol-
lar limit to gifts could have been set at $1,000 and the basic principle of
there being a specific rule by which to determine what is normal and
pathological would be sustained. However, it would be more difficult to
demonstrate that a gift of that magnitude does not constitute a corruption
of the public interest in the eyes of citizens. Obviously, the greater the
value of a gift the less believable the assertion that the person receiving the
gift was not influenced by it. It may be that the gift limit could be $100 or
that the additional earned-income level could be $40,000 and the gift
would be just as believable and efficient as the existing amounts; the point
is that the specific limits in each rule correspond to basic parameters regard-
ing how such actions are likely to be perceived. A principle that underpins
much of the content of these rules is that public servants must not engage
in behaviors that are too overt and obvious in their illustration of how the
concrete private body of the public servant conflicts with the presumed
purity and objectivity of their abstract public body. If former employees
and advisors are to lobby for you on behalf of an interest group, they
should at least wait a year; it looks better. If you do take a trip paid for by
private money, don’t let it go beyond four days; it doesn’t look good.
Maybe it is true that elected public servants will tend to act on behalf of
important supporters and campaign contributors, but at least don’t make
it too obvious.
The investigation into the violation of many of the rules listed above
by Representative “Bud” Shuster (R-Pa.) illustrates this principle. Shu-
ster, chairman of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
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became the object of an official investigation by the Committee on Stan-
dards of Official Conduct (CSOC) largely as a result of Shuster’s appar-
ent collusion with his former chief of staff, Ann Eppard, who had worked
for him for twenty-two years (Committee on Standards of Official Con-
duct 2000a). After resigning her post, Eppard established her own lobby-
ing firm and lobbied Shuster on behalf of her clients during and after 
the twelve-month period following her resignation. As already noted,
senior house staff are not allowed to lobby their former employers for
twelve months following the end of their employment. The official report
notes that this restriction, enacted in 1989, was intended “to diminish any
appearance that Government decisions might be affected by the improper use 
by an individual of his former senior position” (CSOC 2000a, 8; italics in
original).
Shuster and Eppard proved to be inept at keeping up appearances.
Not only was Eppard the former chief of staff, she was also, while she was
lobbying Shuster, the assistant treasurer for Shuster’s reelection campaign
and a significant fund-raiser (in itself, it is perfectly legal to be a lobbyist
and a campaign officer or fund-raiser—it simply must not appear to be
something that is done in exchange for some favor). Shortly after Eppard
began to represent Frito-Lay and Federal Express, Shuster pushed through
the Congress the granting of a waiver from many federal safety regulations
for midsized delivery trucks (such as those used by both companies): “A
quiet lobbying campaign aimed at the House Transportation Committee
yielded in a few months what years of regulatory struggles had not”
(CSOC 2000a, 79). After Eppard was hired by Amtrak, Shuster champi-
oned a bill that provided Amtrak with money and financial restructuring,
exactly what Amtrak had hired Eppard to accomplish. After Eppard was
hired by the Outdoor Advertising Association of America, Shuster argued
on behalf of a bill allowing more billboards to be place along routes des-
ignated as scenic byways, and legislation was eventually passed (CSOC
2000a, 79–82). There are a great many additional potential rules infrac-
tions investigated by the CSOC, including a trip by Shuster to Puerto
Rico paid for by one of Eppard’s clients, frequent stays by Shuster at
Eppard’s home, and Shuster’s frequent use of Eppard’s car.
It should be noted that the CSOC found Shuster not guilty of any
infractions in the three legislative cases noted above. Yet, he was found to
have violated the letter of the law with regard to the twelve-month rule and
gift rules, and was found guilty of bad campaign-finance accounting and
a few other minor infractions. All the infractions boil down to the violation
of one rule, literally rule number 1, clause I of the Code of Official Con-
duct, “a Member, officer, or employee of the House of Representatives
shall conduct himself at all times in a manner which shall reflect creditably
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on the House of Representatives.” What Shuster was ultimately found
guilty of is not being a good enough actor when it comes to maintaining
the illusion of the purity of the public good from private interests. The 
letter of reproval issued to Shuster by the CSOC reads like a mantra for
clause I; it begins by noting that “by your actions you have brought dis-
credit to the House of Representatives” and goes on to establish why each
infraction constitutes a violation of clause I: “The first area of misconduct,
constituting conduct that did not reflect creditably on the House of Rep-
resentatives. . . . The third area of misconduct to which you admitted, and
which constitutes conduct by you that did not reflect creditably on the
House of Representatives. . . . The fifth area of misconduct to which you
have admitted, and which constitutes conduct that did not reflect cred-
itably on the House of Representatives” (CSOC 2000b). The letter con-
cludes with the following statement: “In our free and democratic system
of republican government, it is vital that citizens feel confidence in the
integrity of the legislative institutions that make the laws that govern
America. Ultimately, individual Members of Congress can undermine
respect for the institutions of our government” (CSOC 2000b).
The purity of the public is specular and illusionary, a performative
gesture, a product of a series of rules designed to cloak the fetishistic
nature of the public/private split. In Leviticus, the division between the
clean and the unclean was such that by following the rules of separation
one could completely realize the conceptual goal of wholeness as it was
understood at the time. In Washington, D.C., the fetishistic nature of the
public makes it impossible to fully realize the separation of the public and
private in terms of the actual content of politics. The legal fiction, as Kan-
torowicz terms it, of the abstract body of the public is materialized and
regulated through the rules of separation in that what is kept pure is not
politics itself but, rather, its categorizations and self-presentations. Given
the impossibility of removing ”private interests” from either the real bod-
ies of public servants or from the actual substance of bourgeois politics, a
series of rules and practices are instituted in order to purge the realm of
appearances from acts that challenge the categorization of society as divided
into two mutually exclusive registers, the public and the private. The suc-
cess of these rules of separation thus relies upon two interrelated impera-
tives, to regulate and cloak or eliminate all those activities that are likely to
be perceived by citizens as a presence of private regarding within the pub-
lic body, and to structure the parameters and boundaries of what citizens
are likely to perceive as corruption simply by serving as the point of ref-
erence for establishing what constitutes the normal and pathological in
such matters.
There are a great many potential corruptions of the public by the pri-
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vate that are not included in the rules discussed above, and this can only
be interpreted as a sign that they fall within the “normal” side of the equa-
tion. It could easily be argued that members of the Congress are corrupt
when they vote according to the private interests of constituents in their
districts, or that a president is corrupt when he appoints his friends to
public office, and so forth. We find nothing against these types of activities
in the existing rules of separation, although in both cases it could be a vio-
lation of the rules if appearances are not maintained.16 The pragmatic 
requisites of bourgeois politics necessitate that private interests be every-
where within the public but that everyone categorize these short-circuits
as being normal and desirable.
In this respect, the rules of separation found in Leviticus and those
found in Washington, D.C., are not based on some truth existing in nature
or society but are attempts to formalize and ritualize the meanings and
categorizations through which society maps its understandings and per-
ceptions. The attempt to explain the rules of separation by reference to
the “real” dirtiness imminent in the object or activity itself is thus neces-
sarily bound to failure. Crabs and oysters are no more dirty, from the per-
spective of nutrition or biology, than are salmon and tuna. Clientalism is
no more dirty from the perspective of the interests it articulates than are
pluralist interest group arrangements. Again, to go back to Douglas, it is
only in reference to the system of ideas that these rules make sense and
their object is nothing more than the material constitution and reproduc-
tion of the system of ideas.
Cynicalism, Corporations, and Conflict: Tentative Conclusions
That political corruption as such has never been completely outlawed in
modern societies thus makes perfect sense. The whole point of the dis-
course and practices surrounding corruption has been to make most cases
of private regarding within the public acceptable and normal by identify-
ing only some forms of private regarding as corrupt. The rules and rituals
of separation that function to maintain the purity of the categories of
public and private also support the contemporary legal fiction that public
servants act not as concrete individuals but as articulations of the abstract
body of the polity and, accordingly, are neutral, objective, and free from
the passions and interests that may plague their private existence.17 The
pragmatic problem here is that everybody knows this to be a fiction.
Everybody knows that Bush as public servant cannot be abstracted from
Bush as private citizen, that his religious fundamentalism, corporate
alliances, and personal affiliations directly impact his conduct as president.
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The logic operant here is one of cynicism; we know that the idea of a pub-
lic that is free of private interests and passions is fictional, nonetheless, we
demand that all involved act as if this were not the case. We demand that
the illusion of a real and substantive public be maintained even though we
may not fully believe it.
The question of corporate corruption is simply an extension of these
principles. Rather than dealing with the eternal polity, we now deal with
another abstract body, the corporation. The corporation never dies or
suffers from the infirmities of old age and vice; it is a legal and fictional
subject that we speak of as acting, even though we all know that it does
not exist as a real body and that its actions are no more than the actions of
individuals who happen to occupy positions within it. If the idea of cor-
porate corruption has any precision, then, it alludes to the actions taken by
individuals that go against the purity of this classification, for example,
when individuals fail to maintain the fictional division between themselves
as private, concrete, self-interested individuals and as public, corporate
servants working on behalf of the shareholders/constituents of said cor-
poration.18
The popularity of the anticorruption stance, whether it be applied to
politics or corporations, is largely a product of the tension between what
we know to be true and what we desire to be true. We all know that mod-
ern politics as well as economic life are about clashes of self-interests,
about maximizing profits and utility, and that these arenas are rife with
antagonisms and animosities. The problem is, the public/private divide
has asserted that we, as members of the polity, are bound to each other by
common interests, that through our abstract bodies as members of the
body politic we lead an unalienated and harmonious existence with our
fellow citizens. The tension between the nationalist fantasies that support
this fiction of the polity unified through common interests and destinies
and the reality of society is the common trauma that has led to projects
across the political spectrum that seek to realize this harmonious unity of
the polity. The only significant difference between them is what they
understand the problem to be: greedy corporations, pathological individ-
uals, government apparatuses run amuck, and so on. In all cases the impli-
cation is that there is a pathological presence in society; something is out
of place.
The popularity of anticorruption discourse is also a testament to the
success of the rituals and rules of separation in regard to the categories of
public and private. Rather than reject the categories as bourgeois fantasies
designed to support the fiction of the polity, the discontented seek to pro-
duce social change by way of and through these categories. As has been
demonstrated here, even the academic literature on corruption has taken
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the categories of public and private to be natural, essential, universal, indis-
putable, and inescapable. Thus, the question of corruption has remained
largely a technocratic one, involving managing things properly so that
everything stays where it should be; the state stays out of our private lives,
corporations stay accountable to the public, Americans stay in their corner
of the world, and so forth. What is always missing is the “ought” function,
the positing of things in terms of what ought to be rather than in terms of
keeping things in their proper place. The shift from the traditional to the
modern notion of corruption has coincided with our relinquishing the
question of ought to bourgeois political ontology. The radical position today
is not to obsess over corporate corruption and remain trapped by the fal-
lacy that if only some procedures were reformed and greed kept in check
the public interest could be realized. The radical position today is to reject
the categories of public and private as they are presently constituted and to
expose all the questions that have been subsumed by the discourse on cor-
ruption. The task at hand today is to go beyond the moralistic, techno-
cratic, and formalistic positions that the concept of corruption leads us to.
The real problem is not that something is out of place; it is that there is no
political process through which we can posit what we think the good soci-
ety is, in order to know if we are moving in the proper direction or are in a
state of diaphthora. Illusions of purity and the desire for order have replaced
real politics; that is the problem.
Notes
Many of the ideas and arguments presented here were developed during numerous
discussions with Constantine Tsoukalas, without whose input and encourage-
ment this essay would not have been possible. Stanley Aronowitz, John Bowman,
Andreas Karras, Lenny Markovitz, Eleni Natsiopoulou, Frances Fox Piven, and
Yannis Stavrakakis have read earlier versions of this essay and have provided
important comments and suggestions. This essay has also benefited greatly from
the input of Randy Martin and the Social Text editorial collective.
1. For a discussion of the various ways that political corruption has been
defined, see Heidenheimer, Johnston, and LeVine (1989). They argue that there
are three ways: “public office centered,” as a deviation from the requisites of
public office; “market centered,” as rent-seeking activity by civil servants; and
“public interest centered”’ as action that does damage to the public interest. All
three of these definitions contain the idea that the public is subverted by the pri-
vate.
2. Aristotle sometimes identifies four types of constitution, including oli-
garchy in the list and replacing polity with democracy.
3. The standard definition of diaphthora can be found in the Liddle-Scott
Greek-English lexicon, which is available online at www.perseus.tufts.edu.
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4. Peter Euben (1989) has equated the term stasis, not diaphthora, with polit-
ical corruption. Stasis refers to the destruction and fracturing of the political
community, and thus can also easily be thought of as diaphthora. As with diaph-
thora, stasis does not imply any question of public-private transgression.
5. This brief discussion of the categories of public and private necessarily
skips over many important questions and debates. A much more extended dis-
cussion of these points is needed to demonstrate the full import and causes of
this rise of the public-private split. Toward this end, and in addition to Kan-
torowicz, Norbert Elias’s The Civilizing Process (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell,
2000), particularly the discussions of how the king becomes transformed from a
feudal lord into a public functionary, is a seminal text.
6. Marcel Mauss’s The Gift (1990) is also relevant to this question. Accord-
ing to Mauss, “The very word ‘interest’ is itself recent, originally an accounting
technique: the Latin word interest was written on account books against the sums
of interest that had to be collected. In ancient systems of morality of the most
epicurean kind it is the good and pleasurable that is sought after, and not mater-
ial utility. The victory of rationalism and mercantilism was needed before the
notions of profit and the individual, raised to the level of principles, were intro-
duced. One can almost date—since Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees—the tri-
umph of the notion of individual interest. Only with great difficulty and the use
of periphrasis can these two words be translated into Latin, Greek, or Arabic”
(76). See also Louis Dumont (1977) on the rise of these ideas.
7. The question of corruption is particularly confusing in the case of Machi-
avelli because already present in his work is the public-private split and the ques-
tion of interests, as when he states, “So the senators sent two ambassadors to beg
him to set aside private enmities, and in the public interest to make the nomina-
tion” (523). In this context, it is easy to accept Shumer’s argument that the sub-
version of the public by the private is one dimension of corruption for Machi-
avelli. But, even if we accept this argument, Hirschman is still correct in his
assessment, and the concept of corruption found in Machiavelli is still traditional
because private interests in this context function as bribery did in the earlier
example, as something that decreases virtue. Thus, private interests are bad in
themselves, and corruption is not simply the improper presence of private inter-
ests within the public. For example, the idea Shumer puts forth that average cit-
izens are corrupted by their privatization is completely unthinkable from the
point of view of the modern understanding of corruption. It does not make sense
in the modern context to say, for example, that voters are corrupt because they
vote according to their private interests. In fact, it is never possible to say that pri-
vate citizens are ever corrupt in the modern sense of the term (although they can
certainly be corrupting, as when they tempt public officials with bribes and
favors). This difference between the traditional and the modern understanding of
corruption is further examined in the next section of this essay.
8. Given that the modern concept of corruption becomes thinkable at any
point after the rise of the public-private split, it seems possible, in opposition to
both Mauss and Hirschman, that the modern use of the term occurs well before
either Mandeville (Mauss’s argument—The Fable of the Bees was published in 1714
with the revealing subtitle Private Vices, Publick Benefits) or the late eighteenth/
early nineteenth century (Hirschman’s argument). For example, Francis Bacon
was convicted of political corruption qua bribery in 1621. He famously con-
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fessed, “I am guilty of corruption and do renounce all defense.” Given the dom-
inance of the two bodies doctrine in Elizabethan England and the relative novelty
of convicting a judge for bribery (at that time, it was common for judges to
receive gifts from winning parties), it seems likely that already with Bacon we
have the use of the term of corruption in the modern sense. The important point
here is that the rise of the modern concept of corruption should not be thought
of as an event but, rather, as a process that begins with the rise of the two bodies
doctrine and becomes fully realized by the time of the bourgeois revolutions of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
9. Note the similarity of this understanding of corruption with the claim of
bin Laden et al. that the presence of Westerners in the Middle East is a corrup-
tion of the sacred spaces of Islam. There is nothing bad or evil about Americans
as such; the problem is that they are out of place. The same logic has been used
by German fascists; the basic political problem here is that things are out of
place, and the political project of Nazism is to return things to their “proper”
order. The problem with regard to the Jews and Gypsies is that there is no
“proper” space to return them to; thus they are always a corruption. The only
“solution” is to eliminate them altogether.
10. In addition to nearly all the contributions in what is undoubtedly the
best-known and most authoritative collection of readings on the subject, Heiden-
heimer, Johnston, and LeVine’s Political Corruption: A Handbook (1989), there
are hundreds of essays in this tradition to be found in the many mainstream jour-
nals that cater to area studies and comparative politics, particularly in reference
to Asia, South America, Africa, and Eastern and Southern Europe.
11. Nearly all commentators on political corruption, including van Klavern,
would readily admit that corruption occurs even in liberal capitalist societies.
The main question is whether it exists as a transgression of accepted rules and
institutional norms or whether is exists in a systemic way. Similarly, the question
is often presented as one of frequency; corruption exists everywhere but there are
pathological elements in underdeveloped societies that result in it being much
more common there than in the developed world. Huntington (1989) says, “Cor-
ruption obviously exists in all societies, but it is also obviously more common in
some societies than in others and more common at some times in the evolution of
a society than at other times” (377).
12. Douglas, mistakenly, assumes that frogs are clean because they are not
listed by name in the relevant sections of Leviticus. She explains the apparent
anomaly of a lizard being clean as a result of frogs having four feet and jumping
(as opposed to other lizards, which do not have four feet and swarm and creep).
That frogs, despite their having four feet and hopping, are unclean can easily be
explained by their amphibious nature.
13. The common dictum “cleanliness is next to godliness,” apparently
derived from an old Hebrew proverb, makes sense in this context.
14. The partial exception in some states within Australia (New South Wales,
Queensland, and Western Australia). All three have recently passed laws against
corruption that are very broad and general.
15. Obviously, this general prohibition against linking gifts to past or future
actions simply requires that the exchange not be explicitly linked to actions; giv-
ing a gift or contribution is fine as long as it is not presented as an exchange for
some action.
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16. As with the savings and loan scandals of the late 1980s, it is almost
always acceptable for members of Congress to lend support to business interests,
but when it appears as being too much support, whatever that may be judged to
be, it can be said to violate the rules of separation precisely because people judge
it as too much, because it does not “reflect creditably” on the state apparatuses.
When it comes to having supported savings and loans that failed and cost tax-
payers billions of dollars, it appears that the threshold for what constitutes too
much is lower than usual. In this respect, it may very well be the case that the
only reason Shuster was investigated and reproved by the CSOC is because the
Journal of Commerce published an article raising suspicions about Shuster’s activ-
ities and because he was also the object of an investigation by the 60 Minutes tele-
vision program.
17. It should be noted that the two bodies doctrine not only establishes the
modern split of the public and private but also makes possible the modern fiction
of the corporation. This was recognized by Kantorowicz and he documents the
rise of the legal fiction of the corporation (1957, 291–313). See also Stoljar 1973.
18. Of course there is much more going on when it comes to corporate cor-
ruption. Rules regarding accounting practices, stock trades, and the like are con-
stantly being adjusted and fought over in the ever shifting demarcation of what
constitutes a normal presence of private regarding in corporate life. Similarly, the
normatively loaded term of corruption comes to stigmatize a whole ensemble of
practices and moralizes these transgressions as the product of “evil” and “greedy”
individuals.
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